We study a key part of NHS policy to ensure high quality health care: failure to supply such care cost the NHS £787m in clinical negligence payouts during 2009-10. The NHS uses risk management standards to incentivise care and we examine their effects on MRSA infections. Using a specially assembled dataset, our GMM results suggest that improvements in the risk management standards attained by some hospitals are correlated with reductions in their MRSA infection rates. Moreover, the exogeneity of this relationship cannot be rejected for higher risk management levels, suggesting attainment of higher standards was instrumental in reducing infection rates.
I. Introduction
The cost of compensating victims of injuries caused by their hospital treatment has been a long-standing source of controversy for the NHS. The resources required to recognise the legitimate right of such patients represent a clear opportunity cost to a budget-constrained health system. Recently, this situation has become especially acute, with public spending cuts coinciding with apparent record levels of NHS expenditure on a growing number of compensation claims. 1 The chair of the NHS Litigation Authority (hereafter NHSLA; the agency tasked with fighting and paying compensation claims)
explicitly recognises this trade-off in the foreword to the Authority"s 2010
Annual Report: "A significant and growing proportion of NHS funds, which would otherwise be available for patient care, is being spent on litigation. Jackson, 2009 ), yet an ongoing role is played by the NHSLA"s policies to help contain hospitals" litigation costs. In this paper, we investigate empirically a central element of this policy in order to determine its effectiveness. We do this in the context of a particular patient safety problem, hospital acquired MRSA infections (itself a source of major public concern over the past ten years), and using a unique panel data set we have assembled for this purpose.
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The source of the above litigation costs is, of course, tort liability. In principle tort liability is itself a means of incentivising care in the NHS, as hospitals found to have caused injuries through negligent care levels are forced to compensate the patients in question. First, hospitals" contributions may be perceived as excessive by hospital management if not closely linked to their underlying risk levels and this may lead to alternative arrangements being sought by lower risk hospitals, and higher contributions for the remainder. 5 Second, care levels may be diluted by such insurance so that the volume of claims rises. 6 In principle, the NHSLA could seek to overcome these problems by setting deductibles (so the hospital internalises a portion of any injury costs it causes), or by experience-rating hospital contributions to the Scheme (so that these contributions rise or fall along with claims history). Since 2001, the NHSLA has withdrawn the use of deductibles, and instead moved towards the use of a form of risk classification (where the NHSLA specifies a direct relationship between the hospital"s contribution and verifiable procedures put in place by hospitals to minimise risk). We describe this policy in more detail in Section II but, broadly, hospitals are assessed according to a number of pre-set criteria and classified into one of three standards as a result. Each triggers a contribution discount, with higher standards yielding larger discounts. Future performance is assessed on a regular basis and allows the hospital to apply to be assessed for higher levels over time. A key objective of the current paper is to assess whether hospitals that attain higher standards (as measured by the NHSLA"s 4 The CNST is a non-funded, pay-as-you-go risk pool. Membership is not compulsory but in practice all NHS hospitals are members. 5 The NHSLA"s Framework Document (para. 2.3.viii) states that one of its key functions is to "determine contributions from members towards the costs of the contributory schemes". Clearly, the viability of the scheme would be put at risk if the contributions paid by low risk hospitals were perceived to be excessive. 6 A formal objective is for the NHSLA "to contribute to the improvement of the quality of patient care by providing incentives within the schemes for NHS bodies to improve cost effective clinical and non clinical risk management" (NHSLA Framework Document, para.
2.2.v).
4 criteria) are associated with improved levels of patient safety (as measured by MRSA infection rates).
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The presence of such an association may be a necessary condition for an effective risk management system but it does not indicate how the system achieves this. In common with other insurance settings, two broad possibilities exist. First, the policy of offering financial discounts for risk management standards is consistent with a motivation to reduce moral hazard through incentivising hospitals to invest in improved risk management processes (Bond and Crocker, 1991) . Second, it could alternatively be argued that the NHSLA is using the risk management standards as a way of classifying those hospitals into groups which, on actuarial grounds, would merit differing contributions due to differing expected claims costs (Crocker and Snow, 1986; 2000) . These two alternative views of risk classification are difficult to distinguish empirically: any relationship found in cross-sectional data (conditional on observables) showing that hospitals with good safety outcomes are those with better risk management standards (and hence with lower contributions) would be consistent with either explanation. However, as Chiappori (2000) observes, providing dynamic data are available on safety outcomes and premiums (or risk management discounts in our case), a distinction may be empirically testable and this is the approach we adopt. 8 In particular, we test for exogeneity of the levels of risk management standards achieved by hospitals as this provides an indication of whether this achievement reflected prior care levels, or induced additional investment in care.
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To the extent that these levels are exogenous to the patient care provided, this suggests a causal relationship running from risk management standard to care and, in turn, this is consistent with incentives offered by the 7 Fenn et al. (2007) and Fenn et al. (2010) undertake a similar analysis of the NHSLA"s previous use of deductibles. 8 See also and Abbring, Chiappori, Heckman and Pinquet (2003) . 9 Chiappori (2000, p. 373 ) favours this approach in his discussion of empirical research in other insurance settings.
NHSLA (risk management discounts) helping to encourage patient care, ceteris paribus.
In order to examine the effects of these policies on hospital care, we need a proxy for care. We use MRSA infection rates within NHS hospitals.
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Hospital-acquired infections such as methicillin resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) have become an especially important policy concern in the NHS over the last twenty years. A dramatic increase in the proportion of S.
aureus bacteraemia that were resistant to penicillin treatment occurred in the 1990s, from 2% in 1990 to a peak of 43% in 2002 (Johnson et al. 2005 are other potentially relevant time-independent variables such as the geographical location of the hospital, and the specialist status of the hospital, and we also explore these. We use time dummies in order to control for specific policy measures (including separate ones for the period covered by the 11 These include the shift towards shorter lengths of stay in acute hospitals (Lucet et al., 2005) , and changes to the utilisation of capacity (Borg, 2003; Cunningham et al., 2006 , with many countries running largescale compensation programmes in these areas: it is essential that these programmes are able to incentivise the agents they cover to take care and to reveal their risk class in order to ensure actuarially fair contribution from members. From a more general perspective, the effectiveness of financial incentives goes to the heart of principal-agent models. Second, we provide a relatively rare study of the empirical operation of risk classification (as opposed to the use of deductibles), which is of great importance to some largescale compensation programmes like the US workers compensation scheme -as well as the NHS. Third, as stated above, we feel that our data provide an opportunity to examine whether the NHSLA"s risk classification reflects hospital heterogeneity or incentivises patient safety measures and thus contributes to an important literature on the presence of moral hazard or adverse selection in insurance settings.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents an overview of the risk management measures used by NHS hospitals with respect to their 13 See e.g. Moore and Viscusi (1990) .
8 exposure to hospital-acquired infections. These measures include both direct cleaning initiatives and the indirect financial incentives rewarding good risk management practices through discounts to CNST contributions. Section III reviews our panel dataset, and the following section outlines the estimation methodologies by which we analyse this dataset to test hypotheses concerning the determinants of the frequency of MRSA infections across hospitals and over time. Section V presents our results and a final section concludes.
II. NHS risk management and MRSA

Liability risk pooling and risk management standards
Hospitals naturally seek protection from the liabilities they may face under tort. Insurance provides such protection but information asymmetries can leave the insurer exposed to moral hazard by removing hospitals" exposure to the costs of their actions, and to the danger of rising premiums as a result of adverse selection. 16 We now describe the current arrangements for protecting against these problems in the NHS. Two adjustments are then made to this estimated contribution. 17 First, each Trust is experience rated on the basis of actual compared with expected claims based on risk exposure measured using the WTE staff data. The experience rating takes one of five values: +10%, +5%, 0%, -5% and -10%.
Second, and most importantly for this paper, the scheme also gives a role to the risk management processes that members have in place when determining contributions. Assessments are currently routinely conducted every two years, but organisations failing to attain the first level of standard are assessed annually. The assessment is based on seven "core" standards, amongst which are specific reference to infection control measures. 18 Trusts which are assessed as complying with the standards are entitled to a discount from their scheme contribution for the following two financial years. The discounts on CNST contributions are 10% (level 1 compliance), 20% (level 2 compliance) and 30% (level 3 compliance). The discount earned by members is applied to contributions in the financial year following a successful assessment and is valid for 2 years. Taken together, therefore, the period since 2000 has witnessed a large number of policy initiatives and managerial changes relating to healthcare associated infection. It is possible that these had some effect on the incidence of MRSA and other health associated infections, but there is little reliable evidence on this. Thus, in the process of controlling for these initiatives, our paper provides a rare opportunity to help assess them.
III. Data
The data used for this project were accessed from various sources made available by the Department of Health (DoH) and the NHSLA. 20 The variables used were aggregated to trust level wherever necessary, and a panel dataset created. As the DoH and NHSLA use different administrative codes for identifying hospital trusts, it was necessary to match manually the records from the hospital trust names when merging them together. The names of the 20 Appendix 1 details the sources of our data.
trusts were not always recorded consistently across the different data sources and the data matching process involved the use of a search and replace algorithm combined with manual identification of the names in some cases.
For consistency, we used the DoH administrative codes and updated these as and when data sets relevant to the analysis were added. Since all the variables used in this study could not be observed for all the tracked hospital trusts in all years, we ended up with an unbalanced panel data set over the period 2001 to 2008.
Risk management standards
As explained above, the payment for CNST membership varies depending on the hospital"s casemix, the claims experience, and the risk management standards applied. Hospitals with low assessed risk management standards face a higher CNST contribution than those with high standards. 21 Moreover, these standards have been assessed and re-assessed by the NHSLA over time.
Hospitals have a clear financial incentive to improve their procedures via the risk management discounts which are applied (the moral hazard argument) or, alternatively, those hospitals with good procedures in place have a clear incentive to demonstrate that they are entitled to the reduced contribution.
The availability of panel data creates an opportunity to test whether or not this incentive led to improvements in hospital cleanliness which resulted in better control over hospital-borne infections. Moreover, a fundamental issue for the subsequent analysis of these data is the potential endogeneity of the risk management standard. As suggested above, hospitals with good prior safety records (including low infection rates) would be more likely to apply for and be awarded a contribution discount by the NHSLA at audit -that is, the standards would be endogenous. If by contrast the contribution discount incentivises investment in patient safety measures such as better infection control, then the attainment of higher risk management standards would be followed by reduced infection rates -that is, the standards would be exogenous. We therefore allow for both possibilities in the estimates reported below. have relatively high MRSA rates, the correspondence is not so marked.
MRSA infections, casemix and hospital activity
*** Figures 4 and 5 here ***
Finally, we also have data on the expenditure by NHS acute hospitals on cleaning services, using compulsory returns to the NHS Information Centre since 1999 on Hospital Estates and Facilities Statistics. This expenditure showed a significant increase in relation to the volume of activity (i.e. patient bed-days). Table 4 summarises: *** Table 4 here ***
IV. Estimation Data generation process
The observed total number of MRSA infections in a given hospital i would clearly depend on a measure of patients" exposure to risk -that is, the number of treatment episodes for the hospital in a given year (T it ). Consequently, the expected number of infections in year t at hospital i would be T it  it where  it represents the mean probability of a patient becoming infected during a given treatment episode. 
where the LHS variable in (2) is the infection rate -the number of observed infections as a proportion of the number of treatment episodes.
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Furthermore, if x it is strictly positive (as with almost all our data), equation (2) can be transformed for estimation as
Our observation period in this study is the years from 2001 to 2008.
Clearly during this period there may also have been a systematic change over time in the incidence of MRSA bacteraemia due to direct measures taken by the NHSA to control infection rates, and for this reason we include time dummy variables in all our regressions. In addition, however, it is possible that there is a degree of persistence in the reported rate of infection within a given hospital, due perhaps to the delays in organising appropriate responses on the part of hospital management. The appropriate estimating equation will therefore have a lagged dependent variable as one of the regressors. In the case of the loglinear version of the data generating process, we have:
where the parameter  measures the degree of persistence.
An important issue for estimation arises from the possibility that d is an endogenous regressor due to the possibility that past levels of expenditure on risk management activities (including infection control measures) help determine the standard applied for and achieved. If we can further assume that E[ln( it )|z] is a constant independent of an instrumental variable vector z, then even where d is shown to be endogenous it is possible to estimate consistently the parameters of the log-linear model in (4) using a dynamic GMM estimator which is fully robust and asymptotically efficient (Baum et al., 2003) . In estimating (4) we have an additional source of endogeneity bias through the presence of the lagged dependent variable ("dynamic panel bias").
Moreover, in this case the standard fixed-effect estimator is unable to solve this problem using higher lags of the dependent variable as instruments. The usual solution to this problem is to resort to the use of first differencing of the data, and then to estimate the resulting equation using GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) . The (differenced) lagged dependent variable remains endogenous, but now it is possible to use the lagged levels of the dependent variable as instruments. However, in circumstances where there is stochastic variation in the dependent variable around a relatively stable trend, it has been shown that difference GMM lacks efficiency because in that case lagged levels convey little information about future changes (Blundell and Bond, 1998) .
Drawing on Arellano and Bover (1995) , Blundell and Bond show that an alternative is to estimate (4) as an untransformed equation in levels, using the differences in the lagged dependent variable as instruments. These differenced instruments are exogenous providing that they are uncorrelated with the fixed effects u i . 24 They can be added to the instruments in levels from the difference GMM estimator to form a potentially more efficient system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) .
In addition to providing a means of estimating the coefficient on the endogenous lagged dependent variable consistently, the dynamic system GMM estimator also allows for the possibility of endogeneity in other regressors through the use of lagged instruments. A pairwise comparison of sets of orthogonality conditions corresponding to the assumption of endogeneity or exogeneity respectively can be undertaken, with the difference in Hansen J test statistics obtained from these comparisons being distributed as Chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of regressors being tested for endogeneity. Rejection of the null implies that the regressor (or subset of regressors) should be treated as endogenous.
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As well as ensuring an appropriate estimation strategy, controlling for possible endogeneity of the risk management standards may also provide insights into the way that the standards operate -as discussed in the Introduction. In particular, by indicating whether patient safety outcomes "lead" or "lag" attainment of a given standard, we can comment on whether they address problems associated with the classification of hospital risk or incentives to reduce it that are faced by the NHSLA. Table 5 shows the results for the system GMM model used to estimate the determinants of inter-hospital variations in MRSA rates over time. The lagged dependent variable is assumed to be endogenous, as are cleaning costs.
V. Results
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Moreover, because of the ambiguity over the role of risk management standards discussed above, we test for the joint endogeneity of these regressors using a difference in Hansen test as explained above (the result of the difference in Hansen test is reported at the foot of the Table) . We use as instruments the observed overall claims experience of the hospital, as reported by the NHSLA, as well as second and higher lags of the potentially endogenous variables. 27 All other variables are assumed to be strictly exogenous, and are therefore instrumented by their contemporaneous and lagged values. The overall validity of the instrument set is assessed by means of a robust Hansen J statistic which does not reject the null that the full instrument sets are exogenous.
The table shows a significant coefficient on the lagged dependent variable with a value 0.172, indicating a degree of persistence in the infection rates, and confirming the need for a dynamic model. Moreover the diagnostic tests with respect to autocorrelation are satisfactory: as expected, the null of no first order serial correlation in the differenced disturbances can be rejected, but the null of no second order serial correlation cannot 28 . *** Table 5 here *** 26 It seems likely that cleaning campaigns would be directed at those hospitals with higher infection rates. 27 The claims experience of the hospital is the only available candidate for an external instrument; it would seem on a priori grounds to be a factor which may be correlated with the choice of risk management standard, but, given the wide variety of factors in addition to MRSA infections that may lead to a negligence claim, it is unlikely to be correlated with the error term. All other instruments used are internal to the model. As explained in the text, we test for overall instrument validity using Hansen J tests. 28 Clearly, serial correlation of the error terms might be present due to model misspecification. The test for second order autocorrelation in the first differenced error terms can be considered to be a test for first order autocorrelation of the undifferenced error terms; our results suggest that the null of no second order autocorrelation in the first differences cannot be rejected.
Risk management standards
From Table 5 , the coefficients on attainment of CNST levels 2 and 3 are both negative; in the case of level 3 the coefficient is statistically significant, showing a reduction in the infection rate for these hospitals of 23%. 29 In the case of level 2, the effect is equivalent to a reduction of 9%, though this fails to reach conventional levels of significance. In order to interpret these results in the light of the discussion earlier in this paper, we test the risk management levels for endogeneity, using the difference in Hansen test described above.
The results show that the null of exogeneity cannot be rejected.
These results suggest that the incentive properties of the discounts available for attaining higher risk management levels are non-negligible.
Hospitals achieving level 3, in particular, appear to have been incentivised by the higher discount available to invest in new procedures, the outcome of which does seem to be improved patient safety, at least as measured by reductions in MRSA infection rates. This causality suggests that the dominant factor operating on level 3 is the incentivisation of additional investment in risk management as described by Bond and Crocker (1991) . At least some of the improvements in infection rates associated with the NHSLA"s risk classification can therefore be said to result directly from the financial incentives provided within the CNST scheme.
Hospital hygiene measures
Our measure of cleaning costs per bedday was designed partly to measure the extent to which differences across hospitals in cleaning effort impacted on infection rates, but also to pick up the timing and intensity of the "deep clean" initiatives as they affected individual hospitals. The results of the regression reported in Table 5 indicate, perhaps surprisingly, that the intensity of cleaning 29 Note that the coefficients on binary regressors in a loglinear model need careful interpretation; the percentage changes reported here are derived from the coefficients in Table  5 , transformed using the method suggested by Kennedy (1981) . Note also that the effects reported above are short term effects; because the dynamic specification is supported here, the long term effects will be greater.
was not a factor explaining differences in infection rates across hospitals over time. It is likely that hospital hygiene is a much broader issue than can be measured by cleaning effort.
The 
Length of stay and bed utilisation
The estimates also show a strong sensitivity of the infection rates to the average length of stay in acute NHS trusts. The estimated elasticity of 0.551 is statistically significant, implying that acute hospitals with longer mean lengths of stay will have increased MRSA rates, although not fully in proportion to the differentials in length of stay. This suggests that the changes in average acute lengths of stay observed nationally (see Figure 3 and could be explained purely in terms of the length of stay effect.
Our results provide no evidence of an effect of bed utilisation on infection rates. In particular, it seems that hospitals in certain areas of the country have both high bed utilisation rates and relatively high MRSA rates, but that when we control for location, this correlation disappears. The regions which do seem to have high incidence rates of MRSA infections after controlling for other factors are London, the South East and, particularly, the West Midlands. This may have something to do with the comparative demographics of these regions, but clearly more research is needed on this.
Casemix and hospital type
Turning finally to the results on casemix, there seems to be evidence that MRSA infection rates are highest when there is a high proportion of other surgery bed-days. MRSA infection rates also vary according to hospital type:
single-specialty hospitals have much lower MRSA infection rates than others, even after controlling for casemix and length of stay. The coefficient estimate on the dummy variable for single specialty hospitals suggests that the infection rates in these hospitals is less than half that in other acute hospitals, after controlling for casemix and length of stay. This finding may be consistent with Grundmann et al."s (2010) recent evidence that MRSA infections are spread through movement of patients within the hospital system, rather than in the community.
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VI. Conclusion
In this paper we have used a dynamic panel data specification to explore the Clearly the success of this strategy relies on a comparison of the benefits from reduced contributions against the compliance costs required.
Our findings indicate that the higher discount levels associated with attainment of level 3 were sufficient to justify empirically detectable improvements in infection control by some hospitals, but the lower discounts available for level 2 compliance were less effective in terms of improvements in care. This association between risk management standards and patient safety could of course be a simple outcome of risk-related contributions.
However, we have found no evidence to dispute the exogeneity of these standards, which is consistent with the existence of a causal relationship between an improvement in standards and a subsequent improvement in patient safety. This finding therefore supports the view expressed by Bond and Crocker (1991) that risk classification by insurers based on observable investments can be used as a means of minimising moral hazard. Although not tested here, a strong inference could be made that hospitals with measurable improvements in patient safety will be those with reduced liabilities in terms of patient compensation.
In addition to the effect of risk management standards, we have also tested for the relationship between mean length of stay, bed utilisation, and casemix measures on MRSA infection rates. Our findings are consistent with a fall in the rate of MRSA infections, due in part to the trend reduction in average length of stay in NHS acute hospitals (indeed our results suggest that the major part of the overall reduction prior to 2007 was due to the fall in average length of stay). It could be argued that our finding of a significant elasticity of MRSA rates with respect to average length of stay is evidence that MRSA is typically acquired within the hospital, rather than acquired in the community and discovered in the hospital. In particular, they suggest that risk management standards can be an effective part of the NHSLA"s arsenal. This may be equally relevant to other largescale compensation settings where it is difficult for the insurer to identify and manage incentives at a more micro level, such as US-style Workers"
Compensation schemes.
30 See Grundmann et al. (2010) .
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As always, the interpretation (and the detail) of findings need to be revisited as new data become available. We feel that the dynamic panel we have assembled can play a useful role here and we plan to update and revisit it over time. It would also be interesting to explore the possible reasons for the stronger results we have found for level 3 risk management standards: perhaps they require more "intense" efforts in some sense than their lower counterparts. 31 In the meantime, the effective means of control of patient safety and health care resources will continue to be an important topic for the NHS -and for other health care systems around the world.
31 One possibility would be to construct a continuous measure of hospitals" costs of achieving each standard in order to capture effort intensity. We are not aware that such data are currently available. 
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